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The main issues in housing the elderly in the United States are affordability 
and suitability. In the aggregate, there are a sufficient number of housing units 
for the population, and sufficient capacity in the construction industry, to meet 
any foreseeable increases  in demand. However, sharp increases  in housing 
costs in the past two decades, fueled by rising urban land prices and a reduction 
in government support for low-income housing, have created distributional 
problems in housing the poor at prices they can afford. The most graphic evi- 
dence of this problem is the well-publicized plight of “homeless” households. 
Changing population demographics are also creating distributional problems. 
The “graying” of the United States, with a rising share of the population over 
65 years of age and an increasing number of the very old, creates new demand 
for small housing units, with such amenities as level entries and first-floor bath- 
rooms that are suitable for frail or disabled individuals. The demand for these 
units concentrates in Southern and Western areas favored by retirees. In addi- 
tion, there is a rapidly growing demand for “quasi-institutional” housing that 
provides health and living assistance, such as “congregate” housing, nursing 
homes, and “aided living” in private housing units. 
The gross demographics of the U.S. population are responsible for much of 
the strain on the housing market and are also an important factor in the evolu- 
tion of housing costs. Table 5.1 gives population statistics through  1985 and 
“middle-series” projections of  the U.S. Bureau of  the Census through 2030. 
The percentage of the population age 65 and older has risen sharply since 1970 
and will continue to rise rapidly  for the next forty years. While the annual 
growth rate (AGR) of the total population is less than  1 percent from 1970 to 
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Table 5.1  U.S. Population by Age 
~~  ~ 
Pop.  Pop.  Ratio of 75+ 


















































9.8  7.6 
10.5  8.8 
11.3  10.1 
11.9  11.5 
12.7  13.7 
13.1  15.4 
13.0  17.2 
13.4  18.0 
13.8  18.8 
15.5  20.2 
17.3  21.7 
19.2  25 .5 
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Source: U.S.  Bureau of  the Census, Current Population Reports, ser. P-25, no. 952. 
Note: AGR = average growth rate. 
2030, the AGR of the population 65 and older over the same period is almost 
2 percent. The population 75 and older has an even more rapid growth rate 
of 2.3 percent over this period. A particular feature of the demographics is the 
large cohort of “baby boom” individuals born between 1945 and  1960, who 
swell the 65 and over population starting in 2010 and the 75 and older popula- 
tion starting in 2020. 
In the aggregate, there have been sharp increases in real housing prices in 
the United States since 1970 and correlated changes in the net cost of  shelter. 
Table 5.2 gives indices of the real price of housing (calculated from compo- 
nents of the GNP implicit price deflator and reflecting the cost of new residen- 
tial construction) and the price of shelter (calculated from components of the 
consumer price index and reflecting both rental costs and the cost of purchas- 
ing new and existing residences). Both indices increased rapidly in the years 
around 1980 and since then have generally maintained the higher level. Expla- 
nations that have been given for the price increases include (1) a substantial 
demographic shift in the demand for housing, owing to the baby boom genera- 
tion reaching the age of household formation and home purchase, (2) signifi- 
cant foreign investment in real estate, particularly from Hong Kong and Japan, 
which escalated land prices, and (3) speculative bubbles fueled by these funda- 
mentals. 
It is a matter of considerable speculation as to whether the current high costs 
of  shelter will be relatively permanent or will reverse quickly as the “baby 
boomers” pass beyond the stage of acquiring their first house. The two possibil- 111  Problems of Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
ities have quite different economic implications for the elderly. At  present, 
many elderly households have out-of-pocket shelter costs that are a relatively 
high fraction of current income but also considerable wealth generated by capi- 
tal gains on residential property. One housing policy issue has been whether, 
in light of  the relatively high transactions costs associated with moves, the 
financial market provides adequate instruments for elderly households to con- 
vert equity in residences to cover operating costs. Reverse annuity mortgages 
have been tested as a mechanism for providing this liquidity. Related policy 
initiatives involve deferral of out-of-pocket costs, such as property taxes, until 
the residence is sold. 
The baby boom cohort will face a more difficult situation in old age than 
the current generation of elderly. Their real estate purchases will have been of 
fully appreciated property in many cases. If housing prices fall, their out-of- 
pocket costs will be lower, but their wealth will be substantially reduced by 
capital losses. If housing prices stay high, they will face substantial out-of- 
pocket costs without a cushion of capital gainsxreated wealth. 
The housing needs of the elderly, in terms of geographic location, size, and 
amenities, are likely to create pressures that increase their shelter costs relative 
to the overall housing market. Demographic shifts of  the elderly from the 
Northern and Eastern United States to the South and West have been strong 
and are likely to continue, driving up the price of Sun Belt “retirement” homes 
relative to Midwestern “family” homes. The increasing numbers of  older el- 
derly, who are disabled or frail, create demand for dwellings with features such 
as access to shopping, absence of  steps, and availability of home and health 
care assistance. The effect of elevated housing prices is partially mitigated for 
the elderly by some structural characteristics of their demand-they  need less 
space, and they can relocate in areas or regions with lower housing costs. 
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Source: The GNP implicit price is the ratio of  the residential fixed investment deflator and the 
GNP deflator. The CPI shelter price is the ratio of the total shelter index and the CPI index. The 
first series is from July issues of  the Survey of  Current Business; the second series is from the 
Monthly Labor Review. 
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The information in this paper on the housing and economic status of the 
elderly is drawn primarily from the 1984 wave of the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics (PSID). This panel was started in 1968 with approximately 5,000 
households and has since interviewed these and split-off households annually. 
My analysis is based on 2,089 households that had a household member aged 
35 or older in  1968. Of these, 960 had a household member aged 50 or older, 
and  193 had  a  member  aged  65  or  older,  in  1968.  The  original  panel 
oversampled the poor and minorities. Table 5.3 describes some of the demo- 
graphic features of the PSID sample, with U.S. population statistics shown for 
comparison. The effects of  oversampling the poor and minorities are minor, 
and the panel appears to be fairly representative of U.S. households. 
Section 5.1 of this paper outlines the methodology used to measure wealth 
and shelter costs, taking into account the contribution of transactions costs and 
the rather complex system of tax entitlements and offsets enjoyed by home- 
owners in the United States. Section 5.2 summarizes information on aggregate 
holdings of various assets by the elderly; sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss the distri- 
bution of these holdings. Section 5.5 provides information on user costs and 
the distribution of shelter burdens that they imply for elderly households. Sec- 
tion 5.6 gives data on features of the dwellings occupied by  the elderly and 
discusses mobility. Section 5.7 examines the effects on user costs and shelter 
burdens  of  several of the tax policies that have been  adopted, or are under 
discussion, in the United States, Section 5.8 compares the housing problems 
of U.S.  and Japanese elderly along several dimensions. Section 5.9 concludes. 
5.1  Household Wealth and Shelter Costs: Methodology 
An initial picture of the economic and housing status of the elderly can be 
obtained from statistics on current income and assets, out-of-pocket housing 
costs, and physical characteristics  of dwellings. I summarize some of  these 
statistics, from government sources and from the PSID. Going beyond these 
statistics, I try to account for the effects on economic well-being of mobility 
with its associated transactions costs, tax treatment of  home ownership, and 
expectations about mortality, health, income, and housing out-of-pocket costs. 
5.1.1  Income and Wealth 
First consider the wealth of elderly households. This will include not only 
the net worth of current real and financial assets but also the expected present 
value of  the future stream of non-asset-generated income (i.e., labor income, 
Social Security and other transfers, and employer-provided pension income). 
To  account for differences  in life expectancy  across households and differ- 
ences in expected present  value of  nonasset income expectations, I convert 
assets and the nonasset income stream into life annuities.' 
1. For a couple, a double life annuity is calculated that provides a flat income stream as long as 
one of the two individuals survives. 113  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
Table 5.3  Characteristics of the Elderly Population, Age 65 and Older 
PSID  Population 




% married, spouse present 
% widowed or divorced 
% 75+ 
% homeowners 
% of owners mortgage free 
Median house value, 
owners, 1983 ($) 
% of income on shelter: 
Age 65-74 
Age 75 + 
Age 65-74 




Age 75 + 
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Net worth total ($): 
























’PSID,  N = 1,054. 
h1986 proportions: Current Population Survey, 1987. 
‘PSID, N = 823. 
d1983 means from U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Financial Characteristics of the Housing Inven- 
tory,’’ Current Housing Reports, ser. H-150-83 (1983). 
‘1983  means from US.  Bureau of the Census, Currenr Population Reports, seri. P-60, no.  152 
(1986). 
TSID, 1984, sample tabulations. 
~1984  means from U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Consumer Expenditure Survey: Interview Survey, 
1984:’  Bulletin no. 2267 (Washington, D.C.,  1986). 
”984  medians from U.S.  Bureau of the Census, “Household Wealth and Asset Ownership, 1984,” 
Currenr Population Reports, ser. P-70, no. 7 (1986). A median family income of $1,518 per month, 
units age 65 and older, excluding unattached individuals, in 1984 is given in Currenr Population 
Reports, ser. P-60. The Survey of Consumer Finances gives 1983 net worths as follows: 65-74: 
mean, $125,184; median, $50,181;  75+: mean, $72,985; median, $35,939. 
The 1984 PSID provides an inventory of  assets. However, expectations of 
the future nonasset income stream must be modeled. I assume that income 
expectations are determined by current income and demographic characteris- 
tics. The method, described in detail in Ai et al. (1989), assumes that a house- 
hold  forms  expectations using  the  historical relative  income  streams of 
other households from the past that were then the same demographically as 
this household is now. I assume that there is no information available to the 114  Daniel L. McFadden 
household that is not available to the econometrician, that there were no macro 
shocks through the period of the PSID panel that make the life-cycle income 
patterns observed therein unrepresentative, and that relative income expecta- 
tions are stationary once trends are accounted for. Then, the ex post distribu- 
tion of relative incomes for older households in the PSID coincides with the 
ex ante expectation of younger households. I estimate this ex post distribution 
for total income and for income components: labor, transfer, and nonasset. 
The income profiles starting from year t with a head of age A, are assumed 
to have the form 
where s = 1, 2, . . . denotes future years, the 0,  are coefficients, and the d,(A) 
form a quadratic spline that permits a flexible description of the life-cycle in- 
come profile. This system is log-linear in parameters and is estimated using 
PSID data stacked by  household, and by year within household, conditioned 
on all income variables appearing in the regression being positive. The cases of 
zero income almost all correspond to nonsurvival, and for these the regression 
conditioning corresponds to the conditional forecast needed. 
This formulation of the life-cycle income profile and estimation method dif- 
fers from more common autoregressive forecasting models in that I use a direct 
s-period-ahead forecast rather than an s-step-ahead iterative forecast. The rea- 
son I do this is that I anticipate the existence of persistent individual effects, 
which can be approximated in an autoregressive model only with  a lengthy 
lag. A second variation on conventional  analysis is that I combine labor and 
pension income and do not condition on retirement. Thus, this model gives 
unconditional income profiles that incorporate sample information on retire- 
ment patterns and their interdependence on earnings and pension profiles. This 
approach circumvents the necessity of specifying a correct structural model of 
the retirement process and is robust to the nature of this structure. One draw- 
back is that I am unable to do policy analysis of housing behavior response to 
structural changes in retirement programs or to forecast housing demand in a 
future where structural changes in retirement programs have occurred. 
Income forecasts from the model are conditioned only on initial household 
demographics, not on survival of  individual household members. Thus, they 
incorporate the expected effect on income on nonsurvival of head or spouse. 
This avoids structural modeling of, say, income conditioned on the event of 
future widowhood. However, in order to estimate the model using the eleven- 
year window from 1974 through  1984 in which the PSID has consistent in- 
come data and associated demographics, I assume that households treat their 
initial demographic  state as time  invariant.  For example,  a household  con- 
sisting of a couple with head aged 60 is postulated to assume that changes in 
its income profile between age 80 and age 90 will resemble the changes over 
a decade of couples that start with head age 80. In fact, there is a substantial 115  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
probability that this head will die before age 80, and the household’s income 
profile in this future decade will more closely resemble that of  widows that 
start at age 80. Hence my assumption is not very satisfactory. A better solution 
would be to use data on full life cycles in which future income profiles could 
be constructed conditioned on demographic status at each age. 
5.1.2  Net Shelter Costs 
The first component in a calculation of the expected present value of user 
cost of housing is a stream of out-of-pocket costs that will be incurred as long 
as the current dwelling is occupied. For renters, this is simply rent plus utilities. 
In a few states, there is some state income-tax offset for rental expenses. For 
homeowners, the out-of-pocket costs include mortgage payments, real estate 
taxes, utilities, maintenance, and insurance. The deductibility of homeowner 
interest and real estate tax expenses in federal income taxes, and some state 
income taxes, is an important offsetting factor in calculating out-of-pocket ex- 
penses. 
The second major element in user cost is the transaction cost associated with 
moves, purchases, or sales. A house purchase involves loan fees, title insur- 
ance, and other closing costs. A sale involves real estate broker’s fees. Moving 
between dwellings involves direct moving expenses, less easily measured time 
and money costs in setting up the household, and psychic costs of disruption. 
A third component in user cost for owners is capital gains on the housing 
asset. An increase in the present value of net equity resulting from sale of  a 
home at a future date, rather than immediately, is an additional component that 
offsets the cost of ownership. Calculation of capital gains is complicated by 
their tax treatment, particularly a one-time exemption for elderly households 
that was in effect during the period of this study. A second complication arises 
in the treatment of homes sold as part of the household’s estate after the death 
of  the household.  In  this analysis,  I take the “Ricardian equivalence” view 
that bequests, including home equity, have utility  to the household  and are 
determined jointly  with lifetime consumption. With further simplifications, 
this leads me to treat capital gains from sale of a house symmetrically whether 
the household is living or not. Alternatively, the household may treat bequests 
as the unintended residual of a “self-insured annuity” that contributes little to 
utility. This would increase the perceived cost of options in which the house- 
hold owns its home until death, at least to the extent that increases in home 
equity are not offset dollar for dollar by decreases in liquid assets. 
In calculating the present value of expected user cost of housing, important 
factors will be the discount rate that the consumer uses, the length of time 
the household stays in the current dwelling, and the likely transitions after the 
household leaves the current dwelling. First, the Fisherian consumer in an im- 
perfect capital market will use a discount rate that depends endogenously on 
lending or borrowing status, credit limits, and instruments available in each 
period. The length of time the household  stays in the dwelling will be influ- 116  Daniel L. McFadden 
enced by largely exogenous factors such as the death of one or more household 
members, job changes or retirements, and changes in health status (i.e., ability 
to live unaided in a dwelling with specific characteristics). It will also be influ- 
enced by endogenous response to factors such as realized cost of current dwell- 
ing and alternatives and life-cycle issues involving current income, portfolio 
of assets including equity in owner-occupied housing, and bequest motives. 
The approach taken in this paper is to calculate an annualized expected pres- 
ent value of user cost taking all the factors above into account, in a fashion that 
mimics the calculations of a representative household. However, the endoge- 
nous interactions between life-cycle income and consumption patters that enter 
the discount rate, and the endogenous decisions of length of stay that would 
enter the actual calculation of a consumer that solves a life-cycle dynamic sto- 
chastic program, are replaced by exogenous rates and probabilities based on 
statistical averages from a population of similarly situated individuals. 
The formula that I use for calculating user cost of  housing is simply the 
value of a life annuity that has the same expected present value as the actual 
stream of housing costs, including capital gains and losses on transactions dur- 
ing the household’s lifetime, and including capital gains and losses from liqui- 
dation of the housing component of bequests on the death of the household. In 
this formula, future costs are discounted at a rate reflecting the market interest 
rate and the household’s survival probability. I consider discrete choice among 
three dwelling sizes, as well as tenure, so that in each year the household has 
the alternative of not moving or of moving to one of the six possible sizekenure 
combinations. I incorporate a relatively complete model of the offsets resulting 
from federal and state treatment of property taxes, mortgage interest, and capi- 
tal gains. I incorporate concrete models of expectations about future incomes, 
price levels, interest rates, and mobility. These models assume that households 
are Bayesian “imitators” who use the experiences of similarly situated house- 
holds in the past to forecast the distribution of their own responses in the fu- 
ture. I note that these are not necessarily  “rational expectations,” nor in the 
implementation are they based solely on information available prior to the de- 
cision year. 
5.2  Income and Wealth 
Households in the United States enter the “postretirement” phase of  their 
life cycle facing future income streams that are sharply lower than their life- 
cycle peak.  Social Security income, private pensions, and public assistance 
programs are, however, sufficient to assure that most elderly households are 
not in poverty. For many households, owner-occupied housing is the only ma- 
jor asset. Asset holdings decline with age, but not as rapidly as life-cycle theo- 
ries without strong bequest motives would suggest. 
The money income of households, classified by age, is shown in table 5.4. 
Income levels for those over age 65 are less than 60 percent of income levels 117  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
Table 5.4  Money Income of Households, 1984 
All Households  55-64  65 + 
Mean: 
CES, urban unitsa  24,578 
PSIDc 
CPR’  26,5 18 
Median: 
CPR’  22,804 
SIPP‘  20,124 
26,989  14,900b 
24,361d  13,688 
29,465  17,649 
24,677  12,797 
21,864  12,252 
“Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey. 
bIncome per unit is $16.815 for age 65-74,  $12,442 for age 75+. 
‘Panel Study of Income Dynamics, unweighted sample. 
dAges  50-64. 
W.S. Bureau of  the Census, Current Population Reports, ser. P-60, no.  151. 
‘Survey of  Income and Program Participation. 
in the preceding decade of life and continue to decline with age. The lower 
income levels in the PSID reflect the original oversampling of poor households 
for this panel. The substantial rightward skew of the income distribution shows 
in the excess of  means over medians. Figures 5.1 shows total money income 
plotted as a function of age, using PSID data.2 Also shown on this graph are 
nonasset income (e.g., labor income, pensions, and transfers) and transfer in- 
come (primarily Social Security). Total income falls sharply until age 70. The 
United States has a high rate of early retirement, more than one-third by age 
62,  which is evident in the early decline in nonasset nontransfer income. 
The assets of households and their net worth are hard to measure accurately 
from survey data, owing to the highly skewed distribution of assets in the popu- 
lation, ambiguity in the definition and valuation of assets, and reporting biases. 
Table 5.5 gives the net worth of households from different sources; the varia- 
tions reflect some of  the difficulties of measurement. The net worth figures 
from the PSID exclude the value of employer-provided pension funds, the ma- 
jor reason that these figures are lower than the other surveys. Truncation of 
asset responses at the upper end may also lower PSID means. Also, recall that 
the PSID oversamples poor households; these are not reweighted. The Survey 
of Consumer Finance oversamples, then reweights, wealthy households, mak- 
ing it more precise in determining the effect of  the upper tail on mean net 
worth. All the sources show net worth falling with age, although not as rapidly 
as life-cycle consumption models without a bequest motive would suggest. 
Using the method for calculation for the expected present value of nonasset 
income described in section 5.1, I obtain the estimates of  mean and median 
nonasset wealth and total wealth for the PSID population that are shown in the 
2. The curve is fitted using a quadratic spline with knots every five years, using all sample 
households in 1984 for which income data are complete. 118  Daniel L. McFadden 
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Fig. 5.1  Age profile of income (PSID, 1984) 
second panel  of  table 5.5.  Wealth is dominated by  the nonasset component, 
which  includes labor and transfer income and employer-provided  pensions. 
The exhibit shows that, for the 50-65  age range, only 19 percent of wealth is 
in financial and real assets. This figure rises to 39 percent in the over-65 age 
range, as labor income disappears, but the largest share of wealth still comes 
from transfer income, primarily Social Security. 
The ratio of wealth to income rises with age: the ratio of mean net worth to 
income, using the Survey of Consumer Finances measure of net worth and the 
PSID measure of income, is 4.91 for households in the 50-64  bracket and 7.75 
in the over-65 bracket. A different view of  household wealth is obtained by 
expressing it as a life annuity; this is done in the final panel of table 5.5. In the 
50-64  age range, current income is substantially above the annuity value of 
wealth.  This would  then  be  a period  of  rapid accumulation  for households 
seeking a flat or  annuitized life-cycle expenditure  level. In the over-65 age 
range, the  annuity  value  of wealth  exceeds current  income,  indicating that 
households are not disaccumulating  assets rapidly  enough to end their lives 
with zero bequests. The difference in these numbers is not large and is within 
the margin of error in the wealth calculation. However, other data tend to con- 
firm the reluctance of the elderly to disaccumulate assets. 
5.3  The Distribution of Income and Wealth 
The United  States is characterized  generally by  a moderately unequal in- 
come distribution and a strongly unequal wealth distribution. Inequality is re- 
duced for the elderly compared to a younger population, primarily because of 
social support programs. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of current income 119  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
Table 5.5  Net Worth of Households ($1984) 
Age of Head 
~~~ 
Total  50-64  65 + 
No. of households (mil.) 
Mean net worth: 
SCF, 1983b 
PSID, 1984' 









Mean wealth annuity: 
Nonasset, PSID 
Total, PSID 
Current income, PSID 
86.8  12.9" 
66.050  119,714" 
46,325 
24,574  55,587" 





















bSurvey  of Consumer Finances, Federal Reserve 
'Panel  Study on Income Dynamics. 
"Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
by age group and figure 5.3 the distribution of  ~ealth.~  Only 8.2 percent of 
households in the 55-64  age group and 7.0 percent of  households in the over- 
65 age group are below the poverty line:  compared with an 11.4 percent rate 
for all households. However, the lowest 20 percent of the age 50-64  population 
receives only 3.8 percent of the income. There is greater equality among the 
older elderly: the lowest 20 percent of the over-65 population receives 5.1 per- 
cent of  the  income. Wealth  is distributed  almost the  same for the  two age 
groups, with the lowest 20 percent of the population holding about 2.5 percent 
of the wealth. The wealth definition used here, including nonasset wealth, im- 
plies far less wealth inequality than if only real and financial assets are con- 
sidered. 
3. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are derived from the following sources: total household income, including 
transfer income but excluding income in  kind, for all  sample PSLD households in  1984; total 
household wealth in 1984, including real and financial assets and the expected present value of 
future earnings and pensions, for all sample PSID households for which the income projections 
described in sec. 5.1 could be carried through. The income and wealth distributions are estimated 
using a cubic spline with knots at the deciles. 
4. The poverty line, or annual need standard, varies with region and household composition, but 
the overall mean using the distributions of locations and demographics in the PSID is $3,166 for 
the 50-64  age group and $2,354 for the over-65 age group. 120  Daniel L. McFadden 
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Fig. 5.3  Wealth distribution 
5.4  The Composition of Income and Wealth 
The primary sources of  income of  elderly households are Social Security, 
asset income, and pensions. Table 5.6 shows the percentage breakdown for the 
PSID sample and corresponding population statistics. The PSID sample relies 
substantially more on Social Security, and substantially less on earnings, than 
is true for the over-65 age group as a whole. This reflects the fact that this 
sample is poorer,  and  somewhat  older, than  the corresponding population 
group. 121  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in  the United States and Japan 
Table 5.6  Sources of Income, Households Age 65 and Older in 1984 
%  % 
Social security and pensions  579  46.9b 
Asset income  28.1  23.7 
Earnings  14.0  28.6 
“PSID, N = 806 households with complete data. For the 50-65  age group, the sources are 11.8 
percent Social Security and pensions, 11.5 percent asset income, and 73.9 percent earnings. 
bU.S.  Bureau of the Census, Current Popularion Reports, ser. P-60 (1984). 
The composition of assetholdings is shown in table 5.7. This table gives the 
percentage of the population holding assets in each category and the median 
level among the holders of each asset. Home equity is the only major asset for 
many elderly households. Table 5.8 summarizes the percentage distribution of 
assets. In this exhibit, “cash” includes interest-bearing accounts, bonds, and 
other “liquid” assets. 
The presence of  an  asset inventory along with income in  the PSID data 
allows estimation of implicit rates of return by regressing income on assethold- 
ings. Deviations of  these implicit returns from market returns may  indicate 
biases in reporting. The results of this regression are given in table 5.9 and are 
close to market rates (taking into account reinvestment of earnings). 
5.5  Shelter Costs 
The mean costs of housing gradually decline for older households in a cross- 
sectional survey. This correlation contains some cohort effect but mainly re- 
flects the reduced needs for space of households with fewer members and ad- 
justments  to  live  in  lower-cost  areas. However, income drops much  more 
sharply, with the result that the share of  income spent on housing rises. A 
substantive policy question in the United States is whether there are remedi- 
able market imperfections that prevent older households from substituting con- 
sumption away from housing as income falls. 
Table 5.10 gives the share of income devoted to providing shelter, by  age. 
The CES (Consumer Expenditure Survey) share shows a clear upward trend 
with age. This does not occur in a measure of out-of-pocket cost share in the 
PSID, owing to reductions in average mortgage payments with increasing age 
combined with increasingly stringent selection by  the income criteria. How- 
ever, when annualized user cost is considered, there is an increase in housing 
share for the elderly. Because these annualized costs reflect future as well as 
current outlays, they do not change as rapidly with age as the CES measure of 
current expenditures. The inclusion of taxes and transactions costs in the PSID 122  Daniel L. McFadden 
Table 5.7  Composition of Assetholdings 
Total  Age 55-64  Age 65+ 
Median  Median  Median 
among  among  among 
Holders  Holders  Holders 







Equity in home 
Rental property 




71.8  3,066 
8.5  9.47 1 
53.9  449 
20.0  3,892 
12.8 
85.8 




19.5  4,805 
Households (mil.)  86.8 
76.0  7,340 
11.5  13,559 
55.4  568 
25.5  5,662 
15.1 
89.1 




38.9  6,390 
37.3  2,350 
12.9 
77.5  13,255 
11.6  18,144 
48.5  65 1 
21.1  6,882 
5.1 
71.4 




6.5  6,369 
19.0  1,987 
18.2 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation,  1984, except debt data from the PSID, 1984 (age 
group 50-65). 
Table 5.8  Assets of Household Age 65 and Older in 1984 
% distribution of  net worth: 
Home equity  50.3”  38.6h 
Other real estate  7.4  11.2 
Cash  33.2  30.3 
Stocks  4.1  8.6 
Business  3.1  4.5 
Other  1.9  6.8 
Debt as a % of net worth  1.9  ... 
“PSID, 1984, N =  693 with complete data. 
b1984  data, U.S.  Bureau of the Census, “Household Wealth and Asset Ownership,” Current Popu- 
lation Reports, ser. P-70. 
user cost measure is apparently the reason that it gives higher shares overall 
than the CES. 
The relative user cost of owning to renting is expected to rise with age since 
owning involves transactions costs that must be amortized over a shorter pe- 
riod. Comparing these costs for dwellings of comparable size, averaged over 
the PSID sample, we find that this increase does occur but that it is relatively 
small. The reason appears to be that remaining life expectancy is sufficiently 
long, even for the very elderly, to make the amortized transactions cost small 
relative to out-of-pocket  costs.  These results  are given  in  table  5.1  1. Also 
shown in this table is the ratio of  the user cost of moving versus staying in 123  Problems of Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
Table 5.9  Relation of Asset Income to Assetholdings, 1984 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Asset 
Income 
Independent Variable  Estimate  Standard Error 
Cash  .0504  .0029 
Bonds  .0257  ,0005 
Business nonlabor income  .0259  .0037 
Real property  ,025  1  ,0021 
Stocks  .0458  ,0025 
Note: N = 823. R2  = 0.840. 
Table 5.10  Shelter Share of Income 
50-65  65-74  75  + 
CES, shelter and utilities"  19.8  24.0  26.7 
PSID out of pocketb  20.8  17.6  18.6 
PSID user costC  27.1  33.7  33.4 
~ 
Consumer  Expenditure Survey, 1984, share of shelter plus utility expenditures. The first age group 
is 55-64. 
bPanel Study on Income Dynamics, 1982, annual expenditures for shelter and utilities, for house- 
holds with $5,000 or more per year income. 
'Panel  Study on Income Dynamics, 1984, annualized user cost, median share. 
Table 5.11  User Cost Ratios 
Age Group 
50-65  65-74  75 i 
PSID, mean ratio of owner to renter user cost  1  1.45  1.54  1.58 
PSID, mean ratio of mover to stayer user cost  1.17  1.17  1.14 
dwellings of comparable size. Despite the amortization of moving costs over a 
shorter time for the elderly, this ratio does not change significantly with age. 
The absence of dramatic shifts in relative prices of housing alternatives with 
age suggests that housing changes will be induced primarily by  changing in- 
come and by changing health and demographic status. 
5.6  Housing Status and Mobility of the Elderly 
The majority of the elderly are homeowners, and many elderly homeowners 
are free of  mortgage debt. Table 5.12 gives tenure by age and the proportion 
of homeowners with mortgages. The classification other includes institutional- 124  Daniel L. McFadden 
Table 5.12  Housing Status of the Elderly 
Age Group 











Share of  homeowners with mortgages (%) 
Mean house value (owners) 
Mean equity (owners) 
% of house value 




% who will or might move 
Work reason (% of  movers) 
More house (% of  movers) 
Less house (% of  movers) 
Tenure switch (% of  movers) 



































































Source: Panel Study on Income Dynamics, 1984 
ization, housing  provided  by  relatives,  etc.  The ownership  rate  falls in  the 
“postretirement” years,  age 65 and older, and the other rate rises with  age. 
However, even for the very elderly, the ownership rate remains high. The share 
of homeowners with mortgages falls sharply  with age. Net equity falls with 
age, despite the falling percentage of  mortgage debt. This is partly a cohort 
effect, with the older generations located in smaller, less expensive dwellings, 
and partly a substitution effect, with households relocating to smaller houses. 
However, the latter effect is necessarily small since mobility among homeown- 
ers is quite low. Mobility of homeowners  falls steadily with  age, while the 
mobility  of  renters falls and then turns up at the oldest ages. Since elderly 
renters are the most likely group to be squeezed by  falling income, the in- 
creased  mobility  of  this  group may  reflect  income-induced  adjustments  to 
housing. The last section of table 5.12 gives the proportion of households re- 
porting that they will or might move in the coming year; as expected, these 
rates exceed observed mobility rates. The most common reasons for a planned 125  Problems of Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
move are to reduce dwelling size or cost (“less house”) or because of availabil- 
ity (“involuntary”).  The last category includes units that become unavailable 
owing  to demolition,  condominium  conversion,  eviction,  and  so forth  but, 
more important, also includes moves induced by health, divorce, or death of a 
household member. There are significant  fractions of planned  moves to in- 
crease dwelling size, even for the very old. 
Table 5.13 gives the transition matrix of households from one housing state 
to another. This is an average from the PSID for the starting years  1968-83, 
for all households  in my sample. Mobility rates are lower for owners than 
renters and lower for occupants of large dwellings than small ones, reflecting 
the positive correlation of income with dwelling size and the negative correla- 
tion  of  mobility  with  income.  Among  owners,  there  is  “regression  to the 
mean,” with owners of small or middle-sized dwellings predominantly moving 
upward in size and owners of large dwellings predominantly moving down- 
ward. This pattern  is correlated with age, with the downsizers being mostly 
older. 
There is strong “mover-stayer” heterogeneity in mobility among households, 
not apparent in the one-period transition matrix in table 5.13. To  see this, table 
5.14 classifies the mobility histories of households in the PSID over seventeen 
years from 1968 to 1984. The frequency of long-term stayers is far higher than 
the mobility patterns implied by the “independent-trials” transition probabili- 
Table 5.13  Transition Frequencies between Housing States 
Previous State, All Households, 1968-83 
Rent  Rent  Rent  Own  Own  Own  Row 
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Note: This table is made over all the pairs of  adjacent years starting in 1968. Figures in the table give the 
count, with percentages in parentheses. 126  Daniel L. McFadden 
Table 5.14  Mobility Patterns over Sixteen Years, PSID 
“Independent Trials” Implied Rates (%)  Observed Rates (%) 
Owner, no moves 
Renter, no moves 
One move, owner to owner 
One move, owner to renter 
One move, renter to  owner 
One move, renter to renter 
Total, one move 

















ties given in table 5.13 would suggest. The observed frequency of three moves 
is 6.6 percent, of four moves 4.0 percent, and of tive or more moves 4.9 per- 
cent. The “independent-trials’’ model predicts a lower rate for five or more 
moves. 
One mechanism that an elderly homeowner with low current income and 
house equity can use to convert equity to income is to sell the house and move 
to a rental unit or a less expensive house. In an analysis of PSID data, Feinstein 
and McFadden (1989) find that mobility of  homeowners is virtually the same 
for low-income and high-income elderly households when wealth is held con- 
stant. Furthermore, they find that most elderly households that move from one 
house to another maintain or increase their equity. While the probability of 
actually increasing equity is positively  correlated with income, they find no 
correlation between the probability of decreasing equity and the presence of 
low-income “liquidity-constrained” households. This tinding is supported in 
the analysis of other data sets, particularly Merrill (1984) and Venti and Wise 
(1989, 1990) in the Retirement History Survey. For households over age 75, 
where the studies above have relatively few observations, there is some evi- 
dence from wealth statistics and from dwelling sale and purchase prices that, 
when households do move, there is significant equity extraction. Liquid assets 
rise by considerably less than the equity extracted; this may be a problem of 
asset measurement or may reflect rapid dissipation of the extracted equity for 
medical or estate expenses or as gifts. 
There is a clear tendency  of  the elderly to choose  smaller housing  units 
when they do move; this is seen in the distribution of dwellings by age and size 
in table 5.12 above. Reduced household size is the primary factor driving these 
shifts, but reduced maintenance and out-of-pocket costs may also be important. 
The modest shifts of the elderly from owned to rented dwellings, combined 
with this downsizing among owners, are a net contribution to the post-housing 
consumption stream, even without large shifts from equity to income. 127  Problems of Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
5.7  Tax Policy Effects 
Analysis of the behavior of elderly households suggests that, despite a rising 
share of expenditures on housing with age, there does not appear to be exten- 
sive “bottled-up’’ demand for mechanisms that permit housing costs to be post- 
poned  and charged against the household’s bequests. In addition to the evi- 
dence that mobility rates and equity adjustments are insensitive to liquidity 
squeezes, there is direct evidence from reverse annuity mortgage (RAM) ex- 
periments in the United States that, in most cases, elderly homeowners are not 
seeking transactions that increase current income or reduce current expendi- 
tures via wealth  adjustment^.^ This behavior may simply be driven by bequest 
motives or by precautionary demand for assets to cover contingencies such as 
health catastrophes. A demographic factor is that the poorest households, most 
in need of mechanisms to augment current income, are mostly those without 
any home equity or other assets available for conversion. In addition, a psycho- 
logical mechanism may be at work. For most households, net worth from fi- 
nancial and real assets is small relative to the present value of transfer income 
and pensions and, when annuitized, would yield only a small increase in cur- 
rent income. Most market mechanisms for annuitization of assets also have a 
significant loading penalty. Thus, the annuity appears to be a poor harvest of 
hard-earned savings. 
To assess the potential gain or loss to elderly households from some of the 
tax policies that have been considered in the United States, I examined housing 
costs under alternative conditions. The two policies that 1 consider are directed 
toward increasing U.S. government tax receipts; the question is the magnitude 
of their negative effect on the elderly. The first of  these is the elimination of 
the deductibility of mortgage interest in the calculation of taxable income. The 
second is the elimination of the one-time capital gains exclusion for sales of 
residential property by elderly households; the existing tax law on capital gains 
is summarized in table 5.15. 
Table 5.16 shows the percentage  change in the user  costs of  owners and 
renters when they choose to stay in their current dwelling in the coming year 
and when they consider moving to another rented or owned unit. The largest 
effect is on owner-stayers in the 50-65  age range, 3.4 percent, with a falling 
effect for older households who faced lower 1984 tax rates and had smaller 
mortgage balances.  The effect on renter-stayers  is not zero because the user 
cost  calculation  takes  into account  the  probability  of  a  future  move  to  an 
owned dwelling. 
The effects of  eliminating the capital gains exclusion have been examined 
in detail by  Newman  and Reschovsky  (1987), and I make only a summary 
calculation. The capital gains exclusion is relevant only for homeowners who 
5.  In a RAM, the homeowner receives monthly income in exchange for a claim by the financial 
institution on the homeowner’s equity when the household dies and the estate is settled. 128  Daniel L. McFadden 
Table 5.15  Tax on Capital Gains from Resale of Residential Real Estate 
Tax: 
1974-80 






0.5 X (capital gain) should be included in taxable income 
0.4 X (capital gain) should be included in taxabale income 
Person aged 65 or older can deduct any gains if adjusted selling price is not more 
than $20,000. Otherwise, he/she can deduct ($20,00O/selling  price) X capital 
gain 
Person aged 65 or older can deduct any gains if adjusted selling price is not more 
than $35,000. Otherwise, he/she can deduct ($35,00O/selling  price) X capital 
gain 
Person aged 55 or older can exclude $100,000 from capital gain 
Person aged 55 or older can exclude $125.000 from capital gain 
Table 5.16  Effect on User Costs of Nondeductible Mortgage Interest 
Age Group 
50-65  65-75  75 + 
Owners (%): 
Move to rental unit  .o  .o  .o 
Move to owned unit  I .6  1.2  .2 
Stay  3.4  2.3  .5 
Renters (%): 
Move to rental unit  .O  .o  .o 
Move to owned unit  .5  .2  .5 
Stay  .2  .I  .o 
move to a rental unit or to an owned unit with equity less than the capital gains, 
as the capital gains can be rolled over into a new owner-occupied dwelling 
without being taxed. The average amount of capital gains of homeowners who 
move that are not rolled over into a new dwelling and the fraction of movers 
with positive exposure are given in table 5.17. Households younger than age 
75 do not, on average, have significant “exposed” capital gains, that is, those 
not rolled over into a new home. Averages disguise the upper tail of the distri- 
bution of exposed gains, where the capital gains exclusion has the most effect. 
Nevertheless, these figures suggest that the fraction of households in these age 
groups that would be substantially economically disadvantaged is small. It is 
possible that the exclusion provides a significant incentive for households to 
downsize; Newman and Reschovsky found this to be the case in their analysis. 
Households over age 75 have a mean exposure that is a significant fraction of 
their asset holdings, so the capital gains exclusion can be important. Under the 
1984 tax laws, the average additional tax liability for this age group if the ex- 
clusion were revoked would be on the order of $2,900. This table also shows 
the effect of downsizing. For owner-to-owner moves, the gross asset value in 
housing increases under age 75. This is consistent with the finding that house- 129  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
Table 5.17  Exposure of Capital Gains to Taxation 
Age Group 
50-65  65-75  75 + 
Mean exposed capital gain  1,912  -3,922  13,776 
Fraction of owner-movers with exposure  52.3  51.9  70.0 
Mobility rate (96)  4.5  3.4  2.3 
Price differential,  new versus old: 
Own to own  4,297  7,091  -20,019 
Total  -20,251  -  10,509  -27,833 
holds in these age groups do not use moves between owned dwellings to extract 
equity. Over age 75, there is substantial equity extraction. 
5.8  Comparisons with Japan 
Papers and statistical tabulations of Seko (1984, 1989a, 1989b), Takayama 
(chap. 4 in this volume), and other sources (Martin  1989; Martin and Tsuya 
1989; Ito 1989; and Way 1984) permit some comparisons of housing problems 
of the elderly in the United States and Japan. Both countries experienced high 
birthrates in the decade beginning in 1945 and sharply lower birthrates after 
1955. Consequently, both countries face a bulge of households that will be- 
come elderly soon after the turn of the century, when the working-age popula- 
tions are relatively small. Figure 5.4 shows projections of the proportion of the 
population exceeding age 65 in each country; the fraction of elderly in Japan 
rises faster, and farther, than in the United States.6 Figure 5.5  shows the age 
distribution of the populations of the two countries in 1980; except for immi- 
gration,  these profiles effectively determine the ratios  of  the elderly to the 
working-age population over coming decades.’ The Japanese cohorts between 
age 30 and age 54 in  1980 will induce the rapid growth in the proportion of 
the elderly between 1990 and 201 5. The fraction of elderly in the United States 
will grow most rapidly between 2015 and 2030. These demographic changes 
have dramatic implications for savings rates and labor supply and can also be 
expected to have major effects on housing markets. 
Living arrangements of the elderly in the United States and Japan are strik- 
ingly different, primarily for cultural reasons, although geographic proximity 
and differences in female labor force participation rates may play a role. Figure 
5.6 shows the frequencies of  various arrangements.8  In the United States, 17 
percent of elderly nuclei (e.g., couples or individuals over age 65) live together 
6. Figure 5.4 is derived from table 5.1 and from Japan Institute of Population Problems (1988). 
7. Figure 5.5 is derived from US.  Bureau of the Census Current Population Reports, ser. P-25, 
no. 985; and Japan Statistical Bureau (1982, table 2). 
8. Figure 5.6 is derived from U.S. Bureau of  the Census (1982, table 4); “Marital Status and 
Living Arrangements,” Current Population Reports, ser. P-20, no. 365  1 ;  Borsch-Supan (1989, 
table 4.1); and Japan Statistical Bureau (1983, table 2-20). 130  Daniel L. McFadden 
Fig. 5.5  Population age distribution (United States and Japan, 1980) 
with their children; in Japan, this figure is 69 percent. One implication of these 
patterns is that intergenerational inequality in income and housing wealth is 
significantly  internalized  in  intergenerational  Japanese households.  Conse- 
quently, Japan may be able to avoid some of  the divisive issues of intergenera- 
tional equity that will color U.S.  public policy discussions of the treatment of 
the elderly. However, the percentage of Japanese elderly living with children 
has been dropping steadily over time, from 77 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 
1985. This is creating a significant class of elderly in Japan who face the same 
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Fig. 5.6  Living arrangements (elderly nuclei, age 65 and over, in 1980) 
housing policy is to make provisions for the minority of elderly living alone 
without introducing incentives that encourage the breakup of intergenerational 
living arrangements. 
Homeownership  and dwelling size follow contrasting patterns in the two 
countries, reflecting the differences in living arrangements. This is shown in 
figure 5.7.9 In the United States, the fraction of owners in large units decreases 
with age; in Japan, the reverse is true. Similarly, the fraction of renters in small 
units increases with age in the United States and decreases in Japan. These 
differences are explained by the Japanese pattern in which the elderly and their 
children are joined in intergenerational households occupying relatively larger 
dwellings. An implication for Japan is that, as the fraction of elderly rises in 
the coming decades, there will be an increasing number of three-generation 
households, larger in size and requiring larger dwellings. By contrast, in the 
United  States, there are likely to be  increases in relative  demand for small 
dwellings occupied by elderly living alone. 
The mobility of  the elderly in the two countries is compared in figure 5.8.1° 
Japan shows substantially lower mobility than the United States, particularly 
for renters. However, mobility does not decline with age in Japan as it does in 
the United States. This may be a reflection of the movement of Japanese elderly 
into children’s dwellings and of the mobility of intergenerational households. 
Japan has notoriously high land prices, which translate into high housing 
9. Figure 5.7 is derived from table 5.12 and the 1978  Housing Survey of Japan, Tokyo metropoli- 
tan area, tabulation by Miki Seko, Nihon University. 
10. Figure 5.8 is derived from table 5.12 and the 1978 Housing Survey of Japan, Tokyo metro- 
politan area, tabulation by Miki Seko, Nihon University. The Japanese rates are the rates for a move 
in a three-year period, annualized. Thus, they understate annual mobility rates in a heterogeneous 
population of “movers” and “stayers.” For example, an annual mobility rate of 10 percent assuming 
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Fig. 5.8  Mobility rates 
prices. This is less true in the United States but it also a factor in some major 
urban areas. Figure 5.9 compares housing prices, expressed relative to annual 
income of households, in two of the most expensive areas in the two countries, 
Tokyo and Los Angeles."  In both areas, the ratio rose above 6 in the late 1970s 
and, despite recent declines, has remained near this level. For comparison, the 
11. Figure 5.9 is derived from National Association of Realtors (various years) (median sales 
prices of existing dwellings, Anaheim-Santa  Ana PMSA [primary metropolitan statistical area]), 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1984), and Seko (1989a. table 4-a). 133  Problems of  Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
1984 U.S. national average for the housing pricehncome ratio was 3.23. Hous- 
ing pricehcome  ratios above 4 are high enough to drive many younger house- 
holds out of the market for first homes, unless housing capital gains are trans- 
ferred to them  by  the elderly, via intergenerational  living arrangements or 
bequests.  As  the population  ages, the  supply  of  housing from the  elderly 
should increase, causing pricehcome ratios to fall. However, there is consider- 
able repressed demand, so declines are likely to be gradual. 
Another comparison of shelter costs in the two countries can be made using 
components of the consumer price index. Figure 5.10 gives the ratio of the 
shelter component (housing, utilities, and furnishings) to the nonshelter com- 
ponent of the CPI, with 1982 as the base.I2  These measures of the relative price 
of shelter have risen sharply since 1970 and more rapidly in the United States 
than in Japan. There are methodological issues in defining the housing compo- 
nent of shelter price in the CPI. The ideal starting point is a measure of the 
user cost of  housing of the sort defined in  section 5.1 above, with expected 
capital gains and tax offsets netted out. The price index and expenditure share 
would then be based on the user cost of constant-quality dwellings. The U.S. 
measure errs by failing to adjust for the savings component in housing expendi- 
tures. The Japanese index is based on an imputed rent concept and is closer to 
the ideal. The rise in the U.S. index in figure 5.10 relative to the Japanese index 
may be an artifact of not removing capital gains from housing expenditures in 
the U.S. CPI. 
Income comparisons between the United States and Japan are difficult be- 
cause the exchange rate does not accurately measure relative domestic purchas- 
ing power and because of different accounting conventions for treatment of 
income sources and expenditures and different patterns in the provision of pub- 
12. Figure 5.10 is derived from the 1989 Statistical Abstract of  the United States and Japan 
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Fig. 5.10  Price of shelter (CPI shelter component) 
lic services (e.g., transportation and medical services). Subject to these reser- 
vations, figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the sources of income and the patterns of 
expenditure in the two ~0untries.I~  Figure 5.1 1 identities three income sources: 
wages and salaries, including fringe benetits and bonuses; asset, business, and 
miscellaneous income; and Social Security income. In this figure, we see that 
measured income falls sharply with age in the United States, less sharply in 
Japan. This is due to a relatively modest decline in household wage income in 
Japan, in part because of the contribution of younger wage earners in intergen- 
erational households, and in part because of the Japanese accounting conven- 
tions for pensions, which appear in wages rather than in asset income. 
Figure 5.12 shows the expenditures of elderly households in the two coun- 
tries. First, note that the United States has a much higher expenditure rate on 
shelter and a much lower savings rate than Japan, in both age categories. In 
part, this difference reflects different accounting conventions for imputing con- 
sumption in owner-occupied dwellings. These conventions cause the Japanese 
savings rate to be overstated relative to shelter cost and the U.S. savings rate 
to be understated relative to shelter cost. More careful analysis of savings by 
Hayashi (1986) suggest that, when the savings rates of  the two countries are 
calculated using a common, economically sound method, the Japanese savings 
rate is substantially higher than the US.  rate and comparable to European sav- 
ings rates, but not nearly as high as measured savings in table 5.12 above would 
suggest. The Japanese expenditure rates on transportation and medical services 
are much lower than in the United States, reflecting  less reliance on private 
automobiles, efficient provision of mass transit and medical services, and pub- 
13. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 are derived from US. Bureau of  Labor Statistics (1984) and Japan 
Statistical Bureau (1984). 135  Problems of Housing the Elderly in the United States and Japan 
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Fig. 5.12  Distribution of household expenditures 
lic supply of  medical services. Expenditure patterns change less with age in 
Japan than in the United States, partly because the categories of transportation 
and medical  services, for which demand  shifts substantially with  age, have 
relatively low budget shares, and partly because total income is changing less. 
5.9  Conclusions 
This paper has provided a summary of the economic and housing status of 
elderly households in the United States. Despite rising housing prices and the 
decline of household income with age, the evidence is that, in terms of annui- 
tized wealth, the elderly are about as well off as younger households. Housing 
choices made by the elderly do not suggest the presence of major market barri- 136  Daniel L. McFadden 
ers that prevent their making desired transactions between nonliquid and liquid 
assets. The demographics of the elderly population in the United States and 
the age distribution of capital gains from housing price increases suggest that 
the baby  boom generation will face more difficult economic circumstances 
at the end of its life cycle than the previous generation. Japan faces a similar 
problem of an aging population, which may, however, have markedly different 
implications for the housing market, owing to the high incidence of intergener- 
ational households that internalize some of the problems of economic equity 
between the young and the old. 
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